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16. international antitrust cooperation and
the preference for nonbinding regimes
anu bradford *
introduction
Today, multinational corporations operate in increasingly international markets,
yet antitrust laws regulating their competitive conduct remain national. Thus,
corporations are subject to divergent antitrust regimes across the various jurisdictions in which they operate. This increases transaction costs, causes unnecessary delays, and raises the likelihood of conﬂicting decisions. The risks inherent
in multi-jurisdictional regulatory review were prominently illustrated in the proposed GE/Honeywell acquisition, which failed following the European Union’s
(“EU”) decision to prohibit the transaction despite its earlier approval in the
United States.1 Inconsistent remedies imposed on Microsoft following parallel
investigations by both the U.S. and EU authorities serve as another example of
the regulatory burdens companies face when dealing with multiple antitrust
investigations.
Some commentators believe that inconsistent antitrust decisions reﬂect protectionism. The EU’s negative GE/Honeywell decision, for instance, was alleged
to be motivated by the EU’s desire to protect GE/Honeywell’s European rivals.2
Others, including myself, have argued that protectionism motivates U.S. and EU
antitrust enforcement only in the margins, and that the rare enforcement conﬂicts are better explained by the existing differences in the goals and analytical

* Assistant Professor, The University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Travis
Bradford, Rachel Brewster, Rosalind Dixon, Einer Elhauge, Jack Goldsmith, Katerina
Linos, Eric Posner, and Joel Trachtman for their helpful suggestions on the earlier drafts
of this article.
1. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in
Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8140.htm (last visited May 24, 2010);
Commission Decision No. 2004/134/EEC, O.J. L 48/1 (2004).
2. William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Conglomerate Mergers and
Range Effects: It’s a Long Way from Chicago to Brussels, Address at the George Mason
University Symposium (Nov. 9, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
speeches/9536.htm (last visited May 24, 2010).
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foundations of antitrust law in the United States and the EU.3 Thus, whether the
EU’s GE/Honeywell decision is a manifestation of the EU’s protectionism or an
indication of legitimate differences in the U.S. and EU’s antitrust thinking is
debatable.
When antitrust authorities in a given jurisdiction evaluate a merger, they analyze whether the merger increases or diminishes competition in their domestic
market. Efﬁciency gains or competitive harm outside the home market are irrelevant. Domestic antitrust laws strive to advance domestic consumer welfare, not
global welfare. When evaluating the proposed GE/Honeywell merger, for
instance, the EU antitrust authorities did not consider whether the merger’s possible efﬁciencies in the United States would offset its alleged competitive harm
within the EU. Similarly, the U.S. antitrust authorities focused on the transaction’s consumer welfare effects within the United States, ignoring the effects in
the EU. By internalizing only the domestic costs and beneﬁts of a merger and
externalizing its foreign effects, national antitrust authorities act within the legitimate boundaries of their domestic antitrust laws. This, however, can lead to a
situation whereby a merger that would enhance global welfare is prohibited
because the consumer harm it creates in a particular jurisdiction is not offset by
efﬁciencies in that same jurisdiction.
The end result of the multi-jurisdictional antitrust enforcement is that the
most stringent antitrust jurisdiction always prevails. If the United States wants
to adopt a permissive antitrust policy (e.g., approve the GE/Honeywell merger)
and the EU an interventionist policy (e.g., prohibit the GE/Honeywell merger),
the EU antitrust policy prevails: the GE/Honeywell transaction is banned. Had
GE/Honeywell been able to withdraw from the EU market altogether, it could
have avoided EU antitrust review and proceeded with the merger. This, naturally, was not an option, given the importance of the EU market for the merging
parties. The GE/Honeywell case illustrates how the EU becomes the de facto
global antitrust regulator by choosing stringent enforcement policies.
Purely domestic antitrust laws fail to efﬁciently control cross-border transactions and anticompetitive practices spanning across global markets. Consequently,
demands for establishing a comprehensive international antitrust regime have
increased.4 Those fearing antitrust protectionism argue that an international

3. See generally Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of
the WTO, 48 Harv. Int’l L.J. 383 (2007).
4. See, e.g., Andrew Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, in Competition Laws
in Conﬂict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global Economy 99 (Richard A. Epstein
R. & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004); Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism:
Races Up, Down, and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1781 (2000); Philip Marsden,
Competition Policy for the WTO (2003); Leon Brittan, A Framework for International
Competition, Address at World Competition Forum (Feb. 3, 1992), reprinted in 3 Int’l
Econ. Insights 21 (1992); WTO Competition Working Group, Communication by the
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antitrust regime could restrain and punish such protectionist impulses. Others
support international antitrust cooperation on the grounds that it could mitigate
coordination problems, reduce transaction costs, and prevent enforcement conﬂicts by enhancing convergence across jurisdictions.
International antitrust regime, properly designed, can diminish the various
problems associated with decentralized antitrust enforcement. However, while
the need for enhanced international antitrust cooperation is generally recognized, there is little consensus on the precise content of such cooperation. A
group of scholars and some states, including the EU, hold that a legally binding
international antitrust agreement ought to be established, perhaps by extending
the coverage of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) to antitrust law.5 Others
ﬁnd a binding international agreement politically infeasible or normatively
undesirable.6 The United States, for instance, is skeptical of a WTO antitrust
agreement and calls instead for enhanced voluntary cooperation.
This article focuses on the relative merits of binding and nonbinding international antitrust cooperation. It argues that the primary impediment to international antitrust cooperation is the disagreement over the substance and
institutional form of such cooperation. This disagreement has led states to water
down the proposed binding international antitrust agreement to the point of
severely limiting, if not eliminating, any net beneﬁts. In the end, states have
chosen not to spend resources and political capital in negotiating a binding international agreement that fails to generate substantial beneﬁts, preferring to
resolve their differences informally on a case-by-case basis.
Irrespective of its normative merits, a binding international antitrust agreement is currently not feasible to negotiate. Yet states do not resort to nonbinding
antitrust cooperation as a “second-best” solution to capture limited gains when
their ﬁrst-best regime choice is unavailable. Nonbinding international antitrust

European Community and its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/62, at 12–13 (Mar. 5, 1998);
Munich Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code, 5 World Trade Materials
126 (Sept. 1993), reprinted in 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Special Supp. (July
10, 1993); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Competition-Oriented Reforms of the WTO World Trade
System-Proposals and Trade Options, in Towards WTO Competition Rules 43, 48–49
(Roger Zäch ed., 1999); Robert D. Anderson & Peter Holmes, Competition Policy and the
Future of the Multilateral Trading System, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 531 (2002).
5. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 4. See also Julian L. Clarke & Simon J. Evenett,
A Multilateral Framework for Competition Policy? in The Singapore Issues and the
World Trading System (Simon J. Evenett ed., 2003) (providing a good overview of the
various proposals for including antitrust in the WTO); Marsden, supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, Against International Cooperation, in Competition Laws
in Conﬂict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global Economy, supra note 4, at 66;
Diane P. Wood, Cooperation and Convergence in International Antitrust: Why the Light Is
Still Yellow?, in Competition Laws in Conﬂict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global
Economy, supra note 4, at 177.
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cooperation remains preferable even if a binding agreement later becomes feasible. Given the nature of the collective action problem in international antitrust
cooperation, binding agreements and formal institutions remain largely unnecessary and undesirable. Thus, this article rebuts the presumed supremacy of a
binding international antitrust regime and claims that nonbinding cooperation
offers a better path for international antitrust convergence for now and in the
foreseeable future.
Part I below brieﬂy reviews the nonbinding international antitrust regime
that has emerged in the absence of a binding international antitrust agreement.
Part II explains why negotiating binding international antitrust cooperation has
been difﬁcult and why such negotiation would yield limited beneﬁts for states.
Part III discusses why nonbinding cooperation is more likely to foster international antitrust convergence. Part IV explains why nonbinding cooperation is
likely to persist even if the negotiation of a binding international antitrust agreement were to become viable in the future.

i . the emergence of a nonbinding international
antitrust regime
States have attempted to launch WTO antitrust negotiations on several occasions.7 However, all attempts to negotiate a binding international antitrust agreement have thus far failed,8 prompting states to engage in voluntary cooperation
instead.9 Over the past decade, states have concluded a number of bilateral

7. See, e.g., Marsden, supra note 4, at ch. 1; see also Nataliya Yacheistova, The International
Competition Regulation—A Short Review of a Long Evolution, 18 World Competition, Law
and Econ. 99, 99–110 (1994).
8. Most recently, the WTO negotiations on antitrust were stalled in Cancun in 2003
due to the resistance of the developing countries. See, e.g., Day 5: Conference ends without
consensus, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/
min03_14sept_e.htm (last visited May 24, 2010). On August 1, 2004, the WTO General
Council decided to ofﬁcially drop antitrust policy from the Doha Round negotiation
agenda (“July decision”). See WTO General Council, Decision Adopted by the General
Council, WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004).
9. See generally Oliver Budzinski, The International Competition Network: Prospects and
Limits on the Road towards International Competition Governance, 8 Comp. & Change
223–42 (2004); Frederic Jenny, International Cooperation on Competition: Myth, Reality and
Perspective, 48 Antitrust Bull. 973–1003 (2003); Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global
Governance: A Case Study of International Antitrust Regulation, 39 Stan. J. Int’l L. 207
(2003).
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agreements and engaged in active nonbinding multilateral cooperation in order
to promote convergence and reduce enforcement conﬂicts.10
Bilateral cooperation occurs on a case-by-case basis. Antitrust authorities
exchange nonconﬁdential market information, assist each other in evidence
gathering, coordinate investigations, and negotiate joint remedies.11 The primary
challenge for the case-by-case cooperation is the agencies’ inability to exchange
conﬁdential business information absent a waiver from the relevant corporations. For this reason, enforcement cooperation tends to be more successful in
merger control investigations than in cartel investigations. Corporations seeking
to merge often have an incentive to grant a waiver in order to ensure a swift
investigation and, consequently, timely consummation of their transaction. In
contrast, corporations remain reluctant to facilitate agencies’ joint cartel investigations, as consenting to the exchange of conﬁdential information would expose
them to additional sanctions in another jurisdiction.12
Bilateral cooperation has been particularly successful between the United
States and the EU.13 Frequent interactions between the two antitrust regimes
have resulted in signiﬁcant convergence in their antitrust analysis and enforcement practices. And while intense cooperation does not guarantee identical decisions, as the controversial GE/Honeywell merger demonstrated,14 enforcement

10. These cooperation arrangements have been extensively described elsewhere in the
literature, See, e.g., Bruno Zanetti, Cooperation between Antitrust Agencies at the
International Level (2002); see also Jenny, supra note 9; Budzinski, supra note 9.
11. Even though states have concluded formal bilateral agreements, the decision on
whether to cooperate remains entirely at the discretion of domestic antitrust authorities.
Thus, this form of cooperation is more aptly characterized as nonbinding rather than
binding.
12. Id. Jenny, supra note 9. at 995. See also International Chamber of Commerce &
Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD, ICC/BIAC Comments on Report
of the U.S. International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) 8 (June 5, 2000),
available at http://www.biac.org/statements/comp/00-06-ICC-BIAC_comments_on_
ICPAC_report.pdf [hereinafter ICC/BIAC Comments on Report of the U.S. International
Competition Policy Advisory Committee].
13. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of the Competition
Law, U.S.–E.C., Sept. 23, 1991, U.S. State Dep’t No. 91-216, 30 I.L.M. 1487, 1991 WL
495155; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
European Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the
Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, art. III, U.S.–E.C., June 4, 1998, U.S. State Dep’t
No. 98-106, 1998 WL 428268. See also Press Release, US–EU Merger Working Group, Best
Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations (Oct. 30, 2002), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/200405.pdf (last visited May 24, 2010).
14. See supra note 1.
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conﬂicts between the two agencies are rare in practice.15 In contrast, cooperation
is less frequent between developed countries and developing countries.16 This
might be because developed countries have less to gain from such cooperation.
Developed countries would likely be exposed to numerous requests of enforcement assistance from developing countries, as large developed country corporations often achieve a high market share in small developing country markets. In
contrast, smaller developing-country corporations rarely trigger an antitrust
investigation in large developed-country markets.17
Bilateral antitrust cooperation offers only a partial solution for achieving
greater coherence across antitrust jurisdictions. Multilateral institutions have
complemented the efforts to foster international antitrust cooperation. Since
2001, the most active forum for nonbinding multilateral antitrust cooperation
has been the International Competition Network (“ICN”). The ICN is an informal network of antitrust agencies, which seeks to enhance cooperation among
the world’s antitrust authorities and promote substantive and procedural convergence of antitrust policies on a voluntary basis.18 The ICN identiﬁes, develops,
and publishes policy recommendations and best practices.19 Such voluntary
norms are aimed at enhancing policy convergence, reducing transaction costs,
and catalyzing and guiding domestic reforms. The ICN, together with other
international institutions, also offers technical assistance to developing countries with the view of strengthening antitrust advocacy, building institutional
capacity, and supporting market reforms in those countries.20 Following the collapse of the WTO antitrust negotiations in 2003, the ICN remains the most inﬂuential international regime facilitating multilateral antitrust cooperation today.

15. The GE/Honeywell decision remains the only merger case in which the U.S. and
EU authorities have reached a conﬂicting decision. The EU also prohibited a proposed
merger between DeHavilland and ATR, which was approved by the Canadian authorities.
(See Commission Decision, Case No. IV/M.053 of October 2, 1991, Aerospatiale-Alenia/
de Havilland). Legal uncertainty resulting from multi-jurisdictional merger review is thus
unlikely to form as signiﬁcant of a negative externality as one might imagine. It is, however, difﬁcult to evaluate the costs of the prospect—no matter how unlikely in practice—
that any given merger has a higher risk of being prohibited when it must survive multiple
regulatory reviews.
16. See Jenny, supra note 9, at 993, 979.
17. Developed countries are also more often than developing countries able to extend
their domestic antitrust laws to regulate the conduct of foreign corporations, further
diminishing their need to rely on enforcement assistance. Besides, developed countries
might assume that their requests for assistance would never be met in practice due to the
limited resources of the developing country antitrust agencies.
18. For more information on the purpose and the functioning of the ICN, see www.
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org (last visited May 24, 2010).
19. See Budzinski, supra note 9, at 228.
20. See, e.g., Jenny, supra note 9, at 976–77.
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ii. the limited gains of a binding international antitrust
agreement
A. How States’ Divergent Preferences and Capacities Obstruct Cooperation
States agree that competitive markets and antitrust laws are beneﬁcial. However,
they disagree on the particular goals and priorities of antitrust enforcement.
States also acknowledge the necessity to coordinate antitrust enforcement across
jurisdictions but fail to agree on the speciﬁcs. These conﬂicting views on a globally optimal antitrust regime amount to a distributional conﬂict. A distributional
conﬂict arises when the costs and the beneﬁts of an international antitrust agreement are unevenly distributed among states, and when states therefore cannot
agree on the focal point of coordination.21
The long-standing distributional conﬂict between the United States and the
EU is one of the principal impediments for a binding international antitrust
agreement. Both the United States and the EU acknowledge the efﬁciencies that
international antitrust cooperation could generate, but disagree as to the optimal
content, the legal form, and the institutional framework of cooperation.22
The U.S.-EU disagreement stems from some key differences that persist
between the United States and the EU despite the increasing alignment of their
antitrust laws over the last decade.23 The United States and the EU agree that
antitrust laws seek to maximize consumer welfare. However, social considerations, such as promotion of employment or protection of small enterprises, still
play a role at the margins of the EU antitrust analysis. The EU also employs its
antitrust laws to further European integration. Antitrust laws ensure that anticompetitive practices of private enterprise do not frustrate the efforts to remove
trade barriers within the EU. This market integration goal has led to a more
interventionist enforcement policy vis-à-vis vertical agreements, in particular territorial restraints that threaten to partition the common market. The EU is also
more skeptical of market power and has a lower threshold in bringing cases
against dominant companies (see decisions against Microsoft and Intel).
Similarly, the EU has also historically taken a harsher view towards vertical
and conglomerate mergers (see GE/Honeywell). While there is increasing convergence between the two key antitrust jurisdictions today, these remaining

21. Generally, conﬂicting state preferences regarding international cooperation on any
given issue emanate from many different factors, such as economic disparities, diverse
development priorities and market structures, dissimilar enforcement capacities, different legal traditions, and the distinct domestic political equilibrium within each state.
22. See Bradford, supra note 3, at 522–26 (exploring reasons for the divergence of views
between the United States and the EU regarding international antitrust cooperation).
23. See Einer Elhauge & Damien Geradin, Global Antitrust Law and Economics
1100, 1100 (2007).
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differences have led the United States and the EU to endorse international convergence each toward their respective antitrust laws.24
The United States and the EU also disagree on the optimal institutional
framework for antitrust cooperation. The EU supports a binding WTO antitrust
agreement. This is consistent with the EU’s view that antitrust and trade policies
are intrinsically linked. The United States, on the other hand, fears that antitrust
would lose its exclusive focus on consumer welfare when enmeshed with trade
policy considerations in the WTO. Instead, the United States has promoted antitrust cooperation within the ICN, which allows antitrust enforcers to cooperate
without interference from the trade community.
In addition to the U.S.-EU controversy, disagreement between developed
countries and developing countries regarding the content and the costs of a prospective antitrust agreement has obstructed cooperation efforts.25 Developed
countries want to “level the playing ﬁeld” by enhancing multinational corporations’ (“MNCs”) access to the developing-country markets. Developed countries
also seek to reduce transaction costs involved in MNCs’ cross-border business
transactions.26 In contrast, developing countries are concerned about their inability to control the anticompetitive conduct of MNCs in their markets.27 Developing
countries also resist the idea of a level playing ﬁeld, maintaining that they need
to be able to shield their small domestic corporations from larger MNCs.
Developing countries struggling with capacity constraints have also opposed
WTO antitrust agreement because of the regulatory burden that new international obligations would impose on them.28
Consequently, a critical impediment to antitrust cooperation is the difﬁculty
of overcoming the distributional conﬂict between the United States and the EU

24. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 4, at 1799 (explaining how the United States and the EU
have actively been exporting their own antitrust laws to developing countries and transition economies in the recent decade in an attempt to expand their preferred regulatory
regimes).
25. Bradford, supra note 3, at 526–28, 534–37.
26. Bernard M. Hoekman & Kamal Saggi, International Cooperation on Domestic
Policies: Lessons from the WTO Competition Policy Debate, in Economic Development and
Multilateral Trade Cooperation 439, 446 (Simon J. Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman
eds., 2006).
27. Ajit Singh & Rahule Dhumale, Competition Policy, Development, and Developing
Countries, in What Global Economic Crisis? 122, 127 (Philip Arestis, Michelle Baddeley,
& John McCombie eds., 2001). Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to international cartel activity, because their nonexistent or weak antitrust enforcers are unable to
prosecute the threat effectively. See Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary
International Cartels and Developing Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for
Competition Policy, 71 Antitrust L.J. 801, 801–03 (2004).
28. See discussion infra Part II.C (explaining why an international antitrust agreement
would impose high compliance costs).
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on one hand, and the developed countries and the developing countries on the
other. These distributional tensions have narrowed the scope for any feasible
international agreement.
B. How the Distributional Conﬂicts Would Lead to a Shallow Agreement
Distributional conﬂicts force states to negotiate compromises that lead to shallow international obligations. A shallow international antitrust agreement would
likely exclude all areas of disagreement. The disagreement between the United
States and the EU would prevent the inclusion of rules on unilateral conduct by
monopolies, vertical and conglomerate mergers, and on vertical territorial
restraints. These are the key areas where the U.S. and the EU antitrust thinking
differ.29 The United States would also likely oppose rules banning export cartels,
given that it remains the only country that continues to use such exemptions to
its domestic antitrust laws widely.30 Developing countries would also demand
signiﬁcant exceptions to any obligations subjecting their local ﬁrms to international competition.31 However, meaningful rules might be difﬁcult to negotiate,
even with respect to issues where broad consensus exists. For instance, all states
agree that hard-core cartels are anticompetitive. Yet a commitment to prohibit
such cartels would be difﬁcult to agree on in the absence of a consensus regarding the deﬁnition of a hard-core cartel or appropriate sanctions that should
apply.32
The United States has objected to the WTO antitrust agreement precisely on
these grounds. It has argued that a binding international agreement would
weaken antitrust laws throughout the world. Given the conﬂicting regulatory
priorities, states could only reach a watered-down compromise.33 At worst, the
prospective antitrust agreement would only codify the lowest common denominator among the broad WTO membership.34

29. See Elhauge & Geradin, supra note 23, at 1100 (2007).
30. For example, the United States has defended domestic rules that permit the exemption of export cartels before the WTO in 2003 by arguing that these exemptions “were
conceived as mechanisms for domestic entities that lacked the resources to engage in
effective export activity acting individually.” See WTO Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition Policy, Note by the Secretariat: Report on the Meeting of
February 20–21, 2003, 37, WT/WGTCP/M/21 (May 26, 2003).
31. Singh & Dhumale, supra note 27, at 127.
32. The United States, for instance, applies criminal sanctions and treble damages to
antitrust violations, whereas the EC competition provisions limit remedies to administrative ﬁnes.
33. Wood, supra note 6, at 186.
34. See Roscoe B. Starek, III, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, International
Aspects of Antitrust Enforcement, Address at the Antitrust 1996 Conference (Sept. 29,
1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/starek/starekda.htm (“The sticking point
is whether agreement can be reached on a sufﬁciently stringent set of antitrust policies.
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As the United States predicted, the proposed antitrust agreement within the
WTO grew weaker with every new attempt to agree on the negotiation mandate.
In the end, states were forced to strip the agreement of any meaningful content
in an effort to accommodate their divergent preferences. The most recent proposal for a WTO antitrust agreement forwent substantive antitrust rules altogether, proposing merely to extend the fundamental yet vague WTO principles
of “transparency” or “national treatment” to antitrust matters. Such an agreement would accomplish little in terms of fostering international convergence
and would leave states with limited beneﬁts to offset the costs of negotiating the
agreement.35
Some might argue that even weak antitrust commitments could deepen with
time due to the gradual alignment of states’ preferences and alleviation of uncertainties surrounding cooperation.36 As states learn more about the effects of
the agreement and gradually reach a consensus on a wider set of issues, they
may incrementally adopt deeper obligations. However, even if states were willing to gradually expand their obligations, the WTO—the most likely venue for a
binding international agreement—would not lend itself well to frequent revisions of obligations. New, deeper commitments would call for new negotiations,
which are slow, cumbersome, and costly. Consequently, states are more likely
to resort to the WTO when they are able to agree on meaningful substantive
norms at the outset. When the necessary consensus is missing, however, nonbinding agreements outside the WTO are more likely to accomplish effective
cooperation.

It is the fear of a “lowest-common-denominator” antitrust code that has made many
American policymakers skeptical about pursuing a world code”); see also A. Douglas
Melamed, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust
Enforcement in the Global Economy, Address at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute,
25th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 22, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2043.htm (“[A]ny WTO rules would
be lowest-common-denominator rules that would merely serve to justify weak national
antitrust enforcement. Third, such lowest-common-denominator rules would serve little
purpose”).
35. Bernard M. Hoekman & Michel M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the
World Trading System 133–34 (2d ed. 2001).
36. This argument is advanced in particular by the “transformational approach.”
Transformationalists endorse shallow framework agreements with broadest possible participation and claim that commitments that are that initially shallow deepen with time.
For a discussion and critique of transformationalism, see George W. Downs et al., The
Transformational Model of International Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 465 (2000) [hereinafter Downs et al., Transformational Model ].
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C. How a Shallow Agreement Would Offer Limited Net Gains
A shallow WTO antitrust agreement mitigates distributional tensions. However,
diluting the substance of the agreement simultaneously lowers its expected beneﬁts. Thus, if an agreement becomes too shallow, it is no longer worth negotiating, because states do not gain any net beneﬁts to offset the costs of negotiating
the agreement.
The expected beneﬁts of the WTO antitrust agreement are further reduced by
the low-opportunity costs of not cooperating within the WTO. States with existing, well-functioning antitrust regimes are often able to exercise jurisdiction visà-vis foreign corporations as long as the foreign anticompetitive conduct has an
effect on their domestic market.37 States’ ability to resort to extraterritorial
enforcement makes the case for an international agreement less compelling.
States can also solve many of the collective action problems through informal
cooperation mechanisms that are already in place. Numerous bilateral agreements and nonbinding plurilateral and multilateral antitrust regimes have
enhanced convergence and reduced negative externalities caused by decentralized antitrust enforcement. This further diminishes the need for a binding international antitrust regime.38
Finally, negotiating a WTO antitrust agreement would be costly, reducing the
net beneﬁts from its success. Contracting costs are particularly high when international negotiations involve numerous states, distributional tensions, and burdensome national ratiﬁcation procedures.39 The WTO antitrust negotiations
would involve 153 governments with heterogeneous preferences, multiple negotiation rounds, and extensive multi-issue bargaining. In addition, domestic ratiﬁcation would presumably be necessary in most member states. Legislative
approval adds to the contracting costs due to the additional negotiations, delays,
and risks involved. Contracting costs are further augmented by the WTO enforcement mechanism, which enables member states to enforce potential violations
of WTO commitments with sanctions.40 States are expected to research and

37. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993); Joined Cases
89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission (“Wood
Pulp”), 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (1988).
38. See discussion infra, Part IV.B.3.
39. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,
54 Int’l Org. 421, 434 (2000) [hereinafter Abbott & Snidal, Hard and Soft Law].
40. A violation of a binding international agreement can lead to sanctions (including,
for instance, bilateral retaliation authorized by the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism)
or a loss of reputation. While a state might also impose (unauthorized) unilateral trade
sanctions, an established framework for retaliation within the WTO makes sanctioning
easier, as a state can withdraw an existing concession and beneﬁt from the backing of the
international system that approves the retaliation. Sanctions are therefore more likely to
be feasible in the case of a breach of a binding WTO commitment. However, loss of reputation can occur when a country breaches a nonbinding agreement just as easily as when
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negotiate each provision more cautiously when they know that they will face
sanctions if they breach the agreement. This, obviously, entails higher contracting costs than the less rigorous bargaining associated with nonbinding commitments that lack enforcement.
Developing countries’ resistance to WTO antitrust negotiations is illustrative
of the signiﬁcance of contracting costs. Developing countries blocked the antitrust talks in the 2003 WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun, partially because of
the high contracting costs involved in the negotiations. Already faced with a high
burden of regional trade negotiations,41 developing countries were unwilling to
pursue yet another binding agreement, particularly since the negotiations of a
WTO antitrust agreement would have required signiﬁcant resources and technical expertise.42
In addition, compliance costs associated with implementing and enforcing
international antitrust rules would be high, especially for developing countries
that lack the institutional capacity, technical expertise, and ﬁnancial resources to
establish sophisticated antitrust institutions to enforce new laws. The developing
countries, in particular, would also incur political costs because their importcompeting industries and former state-owned enterprises would resist any
reforms that would remove the government protection they enjoy.43 Even if states
already have antitrust agencies, implementation of international antitrust rules
involves costs if those rules require states to depart from antitrust laws that
would be domestically optimal. New laws might also require retraining of antitrust enforcers or other similar adjustment expenses. Similarly, corporations
might incur further costs if they have to revise some of their business practices
to comply with new antitrust rules.

it breaches a binding agreement. This might be the case with nonbinding international
antitrust cooperation, where frequent contacts among antitrust authorities reinforce peer
pressure for countries to comply with jointly negotiated norms.
41. While the WTO negotiations were underway, Caribbean and Latin American countries were ﬁnalizing their Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA) Agreement; and African,
Caribbean, and Paciﬁc (ACP) countries were still burdened by the aftermath of the
Cotonou Agreement negotiations with the EU.
42. Taimoon Stewart, The Fate of Competition Policy in Cancun: Politics or Substance?, 31
Legal Issues of Econ. Integration 7, 7 (2004); see Editorial, The Real Lesson of the Cancun
Failure, Fin. Times (London), Sept. 23, 2003, at 16 (“It is absurd to push, as the EU has
done, to impose rules in complex areas such as competition and investment on countries
so poor that some cannot even afford WTO diplomatic representation.”).
43. William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in
Transition Economies, 23 Brook. J. Int’l L. 403, 404–05 (1997). In contrast, domestic interest groups are not a signiﬁcant source of resistance to antitrust enforcement in developed
countries. Instead, they have been inactive in conveying their support for, or resistance of,
international antitrust rules. See discussion infra, Part IV.B.2.

international antitrust cooperation and the preference 331

Consequently, while a binding international antitrust agreement would clearly
create some beneﬁts in the form of transactional efﬁciencies, those beneﬁts are
trivial when the substantive provisions of the agreement are watered down to
accommodate states’ divergent preferences and regulatory capacities. The high
costs of cooperation together with the availability of alternatives further reduce
the attractiveness of a binding international antitrust agreement. These reasons,
taken together, explain why states have abandoned the binding antitrust negotiations within the WTO and have turned to other ways to achieve international
antitrust convergence.

iii. why nonbinding cooperation offers a better pathway
towards convergence
Nonbinding cooperation offers a superior alternative for states seeking international antitrust convergence for two primary reasons. First, nonbinding international agreements reduce contracting costs and implementation costs that states
incur while pursuing cooperation. Second, while nonbinding agreements do not
solve distributional tensions, they permit states to capture some beneﬁts from
cooperation by allowing them to cooperate case-by-case in instances where a
necessary consensus exists. States are also more willing to enter into nonbinding
multilateral agreements, knowing that if they later decide to deviate from the
agreement, they can avoid costly sanctions.
Nonbinding international agreements often provide cooperating parties with
the beneﬁts of binding agreements at a lower cost.44 Cooperation within informal networks such as the ICN, or targeted case-speciﬁc enforcement cooperation among a small number of antitrust authorities, involves low contracting
costs. Negotiations in these venues are more circumscribed and less contentious.45 The ICN is a largely virtual network that is ﬂexibly organized around
working groups. The members of the working groups draft recommendations
and guidelines, which are then approved by the Network. As the individual antitrust authorities remain free to decide whether and how to implement the recommendations domestically, the process of approving such recommendations is
unlikely to involve rigorous bargaining. Nonbinding recommendations also
allow antitrust agencies to seek international convergence without involving the
legislators, which diminishes costs and delays embedded in the domestic ratiﬁcation process.

44. Abbott & Snidal, Hard and Soft Law, supra note 39, at 434.
45. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 Ind. L. Global
Legal Stud. 347, 347 (2001). Even though the ICN involves multiple parties with divergent preferences, the promulgation of nonbinding norms within the Network can be
described as being “fast, ﬂexible, and effective.”
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However, critics may argue that nonbinding cooperation is more costly than
negotiating an antitrust agreement through the WTO. Non-binding antitrust
cooperation today consists of numerous bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral
governance instruments, all focusing only on some subset of substantive or procedural antitrust matters. These multiple non-binding instruments, taken
together, could be costlier than a single binding international antitrust agreement, provided that such an agreement was feasible to reach.
However, there are a number of reasons a WTO antitrust agreement probably
involves higher contracting costs, even when compared to the aggregate costs of
negotiating a myraid of nonbinding agreements. For instance, the pursuit of
multiple nonbinding agreements has an important advantage of allowing a
“cherry-picked” solution, where parties can choose to cooperate only on those
issues where the net beneﬁts of cooperation are the greatest. While the absence
of (aggregate) net gains can delay or prohibit an entire binding international
agreement—including the contemplated WTO antitrust agreement—the multitude of nonbinding agreements renders cooperation possible in those matters
and among those parties where the beneﬁts exceed the costs of cooperation.46
Also, risk-adjusted contracting costs are signiﬁcantly higher when states pursue
a binding, nearly universal agreement. The possibility that the parties will fail to
reach an agreement on a speciﬁc issue within the ICN, for instance, is less costly
than the possibility that the WTO negotiations will fail to successfully conclude
after years of intense bargaining. Thus, while the ex post costs of a single, allembracing and successfully concluded binding international antitrust agreement could be lower, states’ ex ante risk-adjusted perception of those costs is
signiﬁcantly higher.
Compliance costs for developing countries are likely to be signiﬁcant regardless of whether they enact domestic antitrust laws and set up enforcement mechanisms under binding or nonbinding international agreements. However,
nonbinding agreements are likely to be more attractive in that they allow developing countries to adopt only those international norms that involve relatively
low compliance costs.47 Nonbinding cooperation is also likely to reduce political

46. This particular advantage also explains why states have pursued extensive bilateral
cooperation. See discussion supra the chapter, pp.322–324 (Section I).
47. However, developing countries might be able to negotiate ﬂexible provisions even
if states choose to pursue a binding agreement under the auspices of the WTO. While the
WTO is built on the idea that all its agreements apply equally to all WTO members, the
WTO principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” occasionally permits
developing countries to enjoy more limited obligations or more generous implementation
timeframes. See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in
International Law, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 276 (2004).
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costs stemming from the domestic resistance of international antitrust rules by
decreasing the visibility and the prominence of the international commitments.
Nonbinding agreements do not remove distributional tensions among states.
However, they often ease bargaining problems by granting more ﬂexibility
regarding the manner and the extent to which states implement international
antitrust commitments domestically.48 Pursuing a myriad of nonbinding cooperation agreements allows states to limit cooperation to parties that maintain
similar preferences or to issues where consensus exists.
States are also likely to prefer nonbinding agreements because the consequences of a breach are less severe. States with capacity constraints or conﬂicting
preferences have a marginal ability, or willingness, to comply with any negotiated commitments. They are therefore more likely to join a regime under which
they can defect without facing sanctions. Thus, by keeping international commitments nonbinding, states are able to capture some gains from international
cooperation without relinquishing control over their domestic antitrust laws, or
assuming the risk of sanctions if they are ultimately unable or unwilling to
comply with their obligations.49

iv. do nonbinding agreements pave the way for a binding
international antitrust agreement?
The above discussion has argued that a meaningful binding international antitrust agreement would currently be infeasible to negotiate, and explained why
nonbinding agreements can still be effective in fostering cooperation. This Part
extends the claim by asserting that even if binding multilateral cooperation were
to become more viable in the future (predominantly due to the gradual alignment of state preferences as a result of voluntary cooperation), states will continue to rely on nonbinding cooperation in the near future.
A. Conventional Wisdom: Nonbinding Agreements Form a Second-Best Solution
Among international law scholars, there is often a presumption that binding
international agreements, if attainable, would be superior tools to generate regulatory convergence. States are assumed to resort to nonbinding agreements

48. See also Abbott & Snidal, Hard and Soft Law, supra note 39, at 445. Abbott and
Snidal suggest that “soft law should be attractive in proportion to the degree of divergence
among the preferences and capacities of states.”
49. In contrast, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism would authorize trading
partners to retaliate if one party failed to comply with a potential WTO Antitrust
Agreement.
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when normatively more desirable binding agreements are not available.50 Many
commentators also argue that the greatest virtue of nonbinding agreements is
their potential to pave the way for binding cooperation.51 Under this view, nonbinding agreements are considered to form merely a stepping stone in a gradual
process towards the ultimate goal: a binding international agreement.
International cooperation may evolve gradually from lower to higher levels of
cooperation.52 States may initially enter into modest cooperative arrangements
that are more viable to negotiate.53 Those arrangements might then incrementally evolve into binding international agreements, as uncertainty progressively
diminishes and consensus among states begins to emerge. Constructivist scholars in particular support this theory of incremental norm formation. They argue
that social interaction, diffusion of information, and collective deliberation
within nonbinding regimes trigger a “self-reinforcing dynamic,” which leads
states to pursue deeper and more formal means of cooperation.54
Historically, the proponents of a nonbinding international antitrust regime
have endorsed such a regime primarily on the grounds that it is more feasible to
attain than a binding international agreement. Nonbinding cooperation is frequently viewed as the “best available” regime, implying that a binding international agreement would represent the optimal solution, if it were attainable.
Diane Wood, one of the leading proponents of nonbinding international antitrust
cooperation, has aptly summarized this view by calling a binding international

50. Steven R. Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conﬂict?, 32
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 591, 653 (2000) (noting the implicit assumption that hard law
affects state behavior more than soft law); see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner,
International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 113, 114 (2003)
(noting that among traditional, positivistic approaches to international law, “nonlegal”
instruments are viewed as being of secondary importance).
51. See, e.g., Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System,
in Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Bonding Norms in the
International Legal System 21, 32 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (noting that soft law can
act as a catalyst for the development of customary international law, which to many commentators is the “raison d’être of soft law”).
52. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Pathways to International Cooperation, in
The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation 50, 50 (Eyal
Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004).
53. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Filling in the Folk Theorem: The Role of
Gradualism and Legalization in International Cooperation to Combat Corruption 1–2 (Aug.
30, 2002) (working paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual
meeting).
54. Id. at 12. See also Abbott & Snidal, Pathways to International Cooperation, supra note
56; Downs et al., Transformational Model, supra note 36, at 467 n.2 (referring to literature
that represents the Transformationalist perspective).
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antitrust agreement an “impossible dream.”55 A binding agreement is regarded
as the ultimate goal and nonbinding cooperation as a pathway towards that goal.56
While some independent beneﬁts of nonbinding cooperation have been acknowledged in the debate, most advocates of nonbinding international antitrust law see
it only as a second-best, partial, or interim solution.57
It is possible that nonbinding antitrust cooperation will pave the way for binding international antitrust rules. Voluntary cooperation facilitates information
exchange, learning, and trust-building among antitrust authorities. As a result,
state preferences are expected to become more aligned, alleviating the distributional tensions that currently undermine cooperation. In addition, the costs of
negotiating a legally binding agreement are prone to diminish, as states would
no longer need to adjust their domestic laws signiﬁcantly (as the domestic equilibrium would be closer to that sought by an international agreement). Such
developments would likely remove, or at least mitigate, obstacles to the binding
international antitrust agreement.
This view suggests that as binding cooperation becomes more feasible, states
may attempt to revive negotiations toward a binding international antitrust
agreement, within or outside the WTO framework. This raises the question
whether negotiating a binding agreement is indeed the optimal path or whether
a nonbinding international antitrust regime is preferable even when the alternative of binding cooperation becomes more viable.
B. Disputing the Presumed Supremacy of Binding Agreements
This article argues that a pathway from nonbinding to binding rules in antitrust
cooperation is not inevitable, nor is it even likely. “Nations cooperate without law
all the time,”58 and they do so for a reason. Nonbinding agreements have their
own, independent advantages and are sometimes more optimal governance

55. Diane P. Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real International Antitrust, 1992 U. Chi.
Legal F. 277, 300–01 (1992).
56. See Wood, supra note 6, at 179, 185–185 (“[W]e need to exercise caution before we
take a leap into a formal antitrust regime”; “A slower approach . . . was the better way
toward our ultimate goal”; and “I believe that harmonization is, at this time, premature”).
57. Id. See also, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust
Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 343, 402 (1997) (“Cooperation is a valuable addition to the
antitrust landscape, but not as an alternative to harmonization or a particularly valuable
end unto itself.”); Wolfgang Kerber & Oliver Budzinski, Competition of Competition Laws:
Mission Impossible?, in Competition Laws in Conﬂict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the
Global Economy, supra note 4, at 31 (supporting nonbinding cooperation on the grounds
of retaining ﬂexibility and allowing for parallel experimentation and mutual learning).
However, Kerber and Budzinski also endorse supplementing nonbinding cooperation in
cross-border antitrust matters with binding international jurisdictional rules.
58. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 54, at 116.
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instruments than binding agreements.59 States choose between binding and
nonbinding agreements in accordance with their interest in any given issue,
taking into account the constraints imposed by other states and the external environment in which they operate. Nonbinding agreements do not merely “come to
the rescue” when legally binding regimes are not attainable.60 Rather, binding
and nonbinding agreements offer distinct beneﬁts, the relative importance of
which depends on the strategic situation of the states pursuing cooperation.
Nonbinding international antitrust cooperation avoids the problem of watering down the rules to accommodate divergent preferences. Nonbinding cooperation also offers more ﬂexibility and reduces contracting and implementation
costs associated with cooperation. A shift to binding cooperation would cause
states to lose those important beneﬁts. In addition, the speciﬁc advantages of
binding agreements are of no real value to the negotiating parties for three primary reasons. First, assuming that antitrust laws are rarely used opportunistically for protectionist purposes, there is no need to pursue a binding agreement
with enforcement provisions. Second, in the absence of coherent interests group
support for far-reaching international antitrust cooperation, a binding agreement does not offer political economy gains. Finally, evolving nonbinding
regimes are pre-capturing the highest gains of cooperation and thereby gradually decreasing the net beneﬁts from the pursuit of a binding agreement.
1. The Self-Enforcing Nature of Antitrust Cooperation Renders a Binding
Agreement Unnecessary The risk of opportunism is one of the key variables
that states consider when choosing between binding and nonbinding agreements.61 Binding international agreements with cautiously negotiated commitments are less susceptible to states’ self-serving interpretation.62 Binding
agreements raise the costs of noncompliance; cheating is easier and possibly
more prevalent with nonbinding agreements.63 Thus, binding agreements seem
advantageous as “assurance devices” in situations where the potential for costly
opportunism is high and cheating is difﬁcult to detect.64

59. Abbott & Snidal, Hard and Soft Law, supra note 39, at 423 (“[S]oft law offers many
advantages of hard law, avoids some costs of hard law, and has certain advantages of its
own”); id. at 456 (arguing that soft law is valuable on its own, and not just as a stepping
stone to hard law).
60. Jan Klabbers, The Undesirability of Soft Law, 67 Nordic J. Int’l Law 381, 384
(1998).
61. Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 Am. J. Int’l L.
581, 593–94 (2005).
62. Abbott & Snidal, Hard and Soft Law, supra note 39, at 426–27.
63. The costs of reneging can manifest themselves both in the form of reputational
costs or actual enforcement costs, for instance, in case of WTO dispute settlement. See id.
at 427.
64. Id. at 429.
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Binding agreements make sense in some contexts. For example, binding
agreements are required as assurance devices most prominently in the national
security domain, where any defection from cooperation would be particularly
dangerous. Also, international trade matters are susceptible to opportunism.
States seek enhanced market access for their exports but are at the same time
tempted to renege on their own commitments to reciprocally open their domestic markets to foreign imports. These types of cooperation problems are characterized as Prisoner’s Dilemmas where the central problem is the states’ pervasive
incentive to defect from any agreement they negotiate. In contrast, when the
incentives to defect from the agreed commitments are low, a binding agreement
with enforceable commitments is less valuable. This is the case in coordination
games where the parties lack the incentives to deviate from the agreement once
the focal point of coordination has been established.65
I have elsewhere argued that the strategic situation underlying international
antitrust cooperation resembles predominantly a coordination game with distributional consequences.66 States would like to coordinate their antitrust policies
but cannot agree on the optimal rules around which to converge.67 For instance,
while the United States would prefer all countries to enforce U.S.-style antitrust
laws, the EU would rather see all countries enforce EU-style antitrust laws.
This distributional conﬂict makes international antitrust cooperation difﬁcult.
However, if states were to agree on the optimal point of antitrust convergence,
the agreement would be self-enforcing, as none of the states would have the
incentive to deviate from the agreed rules.68 This would render the enforcement
65. Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 66, at 592–94. See also Kenneth W. Abbott,
Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 Yale J.
Int’l L. 335, 358–62, 371–74 (1989). While the possibility of defection is not entirely absent
in coordination situations, any surreptitious cheating at least is unlikely. See Lisa L. Martin,
The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism, in Multilateralism Matters: The Theory
and Praxis of an Institutional Form 91, 102 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1993).
66. See generally Bradford, supra note 3.
67. The efforts to coordinate merger policies or cartel investigations among antitrust
agencies, for instance, are unlikely to involve incentives to engage in noncooperative strategies and cheating. States can generally be expected to beneﬁt from a more effective control of international cartels that adversely affect several markets. Similarly, harmonized
merger control procedures enhancing legal certainty and reducing transaction costs and
delays should generate aggregate and individual beneﬁts that would only be undermined
by choosing noncooperative strategies. For instance, neither the United States nor the EU
would beneﬁt from an inconsistent merger review decision between the two agencies,
even though both states can be expected to want the other state to reach the same decision
that they have reached. Id., pp. 514–16.
68. However, China’s ﬁrst enforcement decisions under its newly adopted antimonopoly law offer some indication that antitrust review could be used as a vehicle for
protectionism, possibly calling into question the characterization of international antitrust cooperation as a coordination game (as opposed to a Prisoner’s Dilemma). China’s
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mechanism of any legally binding antitrust agreement less attractive, if not
altogether unnecessary.69
While deliberate cheating is likely to be rare in the antitrust domain, developing countries’ capacity constraints, including a lack of enforcement institutions
and antirust expertise, might lead to occasional defections from international
commitments. However, to the extent that states’ defections can be traced to
capacity constraints rather than to an intentional violation of the agreement, a
binding agreement with enforcement provisions would be unlikely to bring
about greater compliance. Capacity building in the form of technical assistance
is likely to yield better results vis-à-vis developing countries whose inadequate
regulatory capacities renders compliance with the contemplated agreement difﬁcult. The “managerial model of compliance,” which rests on transparency,
capacity building, and persuasion, rather than on enforcement and sanctions,70
seems therefore particularly suitable for ratcheting up antitrust standards in the
developing countries.
Consequently, if the major obstacle to an international antitrust agreement is
not the difﬁculty of ensuring compliance, but the difﬁculty of reaching an agreement in the ﬁrst place due to the distributional problem, the enforcement beneﬁts of binding agreements are limited. This is likely to cause states to prefer

decision to prohibit Coca Cola’s proposed acquisition of the Chinese juice company
Huyian, for instance, raised suspicions on the motivations behind China’s antitrust policy.
The possibility of China becoming a major antitrust force that repeatedly applies its antitrust laws strategically to block the market entry of foreign companies might underline
the limits of voluntary cooperation. However, it is uncertain whether China’s antitrust
practices can revive the WTO antitrust negotiations. It is too soon to argue that China’s
early antitrust enforcement practices have fundamentally amended the strategic situation
underlying international antitrust cooperation. It is also unclear whether China’s enforcement patterns will prompt the United States and other states currently opposing WTO
antitrust rules to change their minds on the beneﬁts of such rules. Second, any WTO
antitrust agreement aimed to constrain China’s antitrust policies would require China’s
acquiescence on those new rules, complicating the negotiations.
69. Charles Lipson has argued that the distinction between enforceable and nonenforceable commitments is largely moot in international law, which lacks the enforcement mechanisms comparable to those embedded in domestic legal systems. Contrasting international
and domestic enforcement structures does indeed highlight the weaknesses of the international legal system. However, this distinction is somewhat less pronounced with respect to
areas of international trade law that are supported by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The dispute settlement mechanism provides for multilaterally authorized (yet bilaterally executed) retaliatory measures. Thus, the question of enforcement remains a relevant
consideration when states choose between a binding WTO agreement on antitrust and, for
instance, nonbinding ICN guidelines and recommendations. See discussion in Lipson,
Why Are Some International Agreements Informal? 45 Int’l Org. 495, 502–08, 513 (1991).
70. Abraham Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 Int’l Org.
175, 197–204 (1993).
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nonbinding agreements even in a situation where a binding agreement is
assumed to be more feasible to attain.
2. A Binding Agreement Does Not Offer Political Economy Gains The choice
between a binding and nonbinding international agreement is also informed by
domestic political economy considerations.71 Binding agreements emerge in
areas where domestic interest groups are active. Interest groups that favor international cooperation in a given issue area generally support binding agreements
because of their perceived effectiveness.72 Binding agreements also offer the
domestic constituency more opportunities to inﬂuence the content of the agreement, as their conclusion generally requires more domestic legislative involvement. In contrast, nonbinding cooperation mechanisms are common in the
complex areas of “technocratic cooperation,” including antitrust, where domestic
interest groups are less active.73
There is no evidence that domestic interest groups, including consumers,
corporations, or industry organizations, would deem an international antitrust
agreement a priority.74 Consumers, who would be expected to beneﬁt from
enhanced international antitrust enforcement, form a fragmented interest group
with little agenda-setting capacity.75 Corporations, on the other hand, have interests that are largely case- and issue-speciﬁc, rendering ex ante support for any
comprehensive international antitrust agreement difﬁcult. For example, a corporation will probably support international cooperation to ensure a smooth clearance of a merger in which it is participating, but may have contrary interests
when its competitors are seeking to merge. Similarly, the corporation’s support
for international cooperation in cartel matters is likely to hinge on whether agencies are seeking to prosecute a cartel in which the corporation itself, or its competitors, are participating.76 Thus, corporations prefer to choose case-by-case the

71. Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 65, at 582.
72. Id. at 600.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., ICC/BIAC Comments on Report of the U.S. International Competition Policy
Advisory Committee, supra note 12, at 2, 6, 10. While the ICC and the BIAC support some
degree of substantive and some procedural harmonization and convergence of domestic
merger regimes, “ICC and BIAC agree that the WTO is not an appropriate forum for
review of private restraints and that the WTO should not develop new competition laws
under its framework at this time.”
75. International antitrust cooperation has not been a priority for consumer organizations either, which might be explained by the “technocratic” nature of antitrust law. See
Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 65, at 600.
76. In general, while corporations tend to deﬁne their interests case-by-case, they are
expected to support cooperation in the case of merger reviews, as this would reduce transaction costs and uncertainty. In contrast, corporations often resist rules that facilitate
cooperation in cartel cases, out of fear of one day being the target of a cartel investigation.
See ABA & Int’l Bar Assoc., A Tax on Mergers?: Surveying the Time and Costs to
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issues and instances in which they want antitrust agencies to cooperate among
themselves.
In the absence of coherent domestic interest group support, states are able to
reap few political gains by pursuing a binding international antitrust agreement.77 As a result, states prefer to focus on other regulatory priorities, leaving
international antitrust cooperation to the domain of antitrust agencies.78 This
has caused international antitrust cooperation to be primarily an agency-driven
regulatory process. Most antitrust agencies operate relatively independently
from the executive and the legislature. Nonbinding international cooperation
further strengthens their independence and expands their regulatory powers.79 It
is therefore not surprising that antitrust agencies have been the principal norm
entrepreneurs behind the pursuit of international antitrust cooperation.80 And as
long as the demand for international antitrust cooperation continues to stem
from the agencies rather than from domestic interests groups or the legislature,
nonbinding cooperation is likely to persist.
3. Nonbinding Agreements Reduce the Gains Available from a Binding
Agreement Today, a growing number of jurisdictions enforce increasingly
Business of Multi-Jurisdictional Merger Reviews 5 (June 2003) (noting that 56 percent of the businesses see scope for improving and harmonizing merger notiﬁcation processes); see also ICC/BIAC Comments on Report of the U.S. International Competition Policy
Advisory Committee, supra note 12, at 8.
77. The absence of interest group support is one reason countries have had difﬁculty
negotiating a binding international antitrust agreement. By contrast, countries successfully concluded the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPs”) largely as a result of intense lobbying by domestic corporations in the
United States, the EU, and Japan. See Sylvia Ostry, Convergence and Sovereignty: Policy Scope
for Compromise?, in Coping with Globalization 52, 55–57 (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A.
Hart eds., 2000); see also Bradford, supra note 3, at 547–48. (discussing why the prospects
for formal cooperation in the case of the TRIPs and antitrust have been different).
78. “States” are in this connection understood as elected ofﬁcials, including the legislature and the executive.
79. Antitrust enforcers rarely need to consult other government agencies or the legislature when pursuing nonbinding cooperation directly with their counterparts abroad. A
nonbinding international regime that exclusively focuses on antitrust matters also empowers antitrust agencies vis-à-vis other government agencies. For example, a binding WTO
antitrust agreement would shift powers from the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR), whereas cooperation under the auspices of the ICN would allow
antitrust agencies to retain all decision-making powers. This is probably one reason the
USTR has endorsed incorporating antitrust in the WTO while the DOJ and FTC have
opposed it. See Spencer Weber Waller, National Laws and International Markets: Strategies
of Cooperation and Harmonization in the Enforcement of Competition Law, 18 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1111, 1122–24 (1996).
80. The attempts to generate cooperation in any international forum—whether in the
WTO, ICN, or OECD—have been predominantly driven by antitrust agencies.
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consistent antitrust laws. Approximately one hundred states have domestic antitrust laws, all of which were enacted without any binding international obligation to do so.81 In addition to the rapid proliferation of new antitrust regimes, the
existing antitrust laws are moving closer to one another.82 Antitrust norms and
economic theories behind them have diffused rapidly across jurisdictions as
countries have emulated more established antitrust regimes.83
A large part of this predominantly voluntary adoption of antitrust rules and
their increasing alignment may be attributed to the market-based diffusion of
neo-liberal economic ideology and increasing domestic support for privatization
and liberalization of trade and investment, even in developing countries and
transition economies.84 In addition, existing bilateral cooperation and nonbinding multilateral antitrust norms have accelerated this diffusion of antitrust norms
across the globe, further contributing to international antitrust convergence.
While it is difﬁcult to determine the extent to which existing convergence
reﬂects nonbinding international rules on the one hand, and other motivations
on the other, the very fact that convergence is taking place has two implications.
First, increasing voluntary alignment of domestic antitrust laws ought to alleviate the distributional problem that has thus far undermined any efforts to
negotiate a binding international antitrust agreement. Voluntary convergence is
also likely to decrease the adjustment cost of cooperation. When domestic antitrust laws increasingly begin to resemble one another, commitments sought
by a binding international agreement would not require states to undertake

81. See http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org (last visited May 24, 2010) (maintaining a list of existing antitrust laws across the world).
82. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 4, at 1787 (discussing cross-fertilization of antitrust laws,
which has produced “increasingly high levels of common understanding”).
83. The existing international convergence has taken place largely around the U.S. or
the EU antitrust regimes, resulting in two “clusters” of antitrust systems instead of a
single de facto harmonized global antitrust regime. While the bipolar antitrust convergence is to some extent the result of a voluntary decision on the part of new antitrust
regimes to emulate the two more developed regimes, the existing convergence also reﬂects
a conscious effort by the United States and the EU to actively export their respective antitrust regimes abroad. On market-based harmonization that occurs when countries have
an incentive to emulate more established regulatory regimes, see Beth A. Simmons, The
International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation, 55 Int’l
Org. 589 (2001).
84. For the most part, the creation of antitrust laws in developing countries does not
appear to reﬂect an externally induced policy change. However, it is difﬁcult to estimate
the extent to which developing countries adopt antitrust laws out of self-interest and the
extent to which they are pressured to conform to the preferences of the powerful antitrust
regimes. See, e.g., Susan K. Sell, Power and Ideas: North-South Politics of
Intellectual Property and Antitrust (1998) (characterizing developing countries’
decisions to implement antitrust laws as a “choice within constraints rather than coercion”).
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substantial new commitments. This would decrease contracting costs and compliance costs alike, and increase the likelihood that even formal cooperation
would gradually become net beneﬁcial. The second implication is that the ongoing voluntary convergence is gradually eroding the beneﬁts of binding cooperation. The voluntary alignment of domestic antitrust laws reduces negative
externalities embedded in the current system, which decreases the need for
binding international rules. In such circumstances, the added value from seeking to codify the status quo becomes questionable.
While it is difﬁcult to predict whether the beneﬁts or the costs of cooperation
are likely to fall at a faster rate following voluntary convergence, it is likely that
net beneﬁts from cooperation are gradually shrinking. Existing voluntary cooperation focuses on issues where net beneﬁts are the greatest and distributional
tensions most manageable; any remaining binding agreement would be left to
address a range of issues with lower prospective beneﬁts. As the pursuit of a
binding agreement must entail some level of ﬁxed costs (in particular, contracting costs), a dwindling pool of available net beneﬁts will likely reduce the incentive to pursue a binding agreement.
Accordingly, as long as (1) international antitrust cooperation continues to be
largely self-enforcing and opportunistic behavior an exception, (2) domestic
interest group support for international antirust cooperation continues to be
weak, and (3) nonbinding antitrust convergence continues to expand and show
progress in mitigating negative externalities, states are likely to continue to rely
on nonbinding agreements when pursuing antitrust cooperation. Nonbinding
instruments may gradually develop toward binding antitrust commitments, but
that is not inevitable. Nor is the move toward a binding international antitrust
agreement necessarily a desirable one as long as the fundamental assumptions
described above continue to hold.

conclusion
This article has argued that the pursuit of nonbinding international antitrust
cooperation represents an optimal choice for states. It is not merely an opportunity to capture limited gains from cooperation while proceeding towards a binding international agreement, as is commonly perceived.
States’ conﬂicting preferences over the optimal content of international
antitrust cooperation is the primary impediment for negotiating binding antitrust rules in the WTO. States have sought to accommodate their divergent preferences by removing controversial issues from the negotiation agenda. However,
this has led to proposals for watered-down rules that would confer trivial beneﬁts
to WTO member states. Because states expect low net beneﬁts from a prospective WTO antitrust agreement, states have abandoned the negotiations to seek
case-by-case cooperation and voluntary international guidelines instead.
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Nonbinding cooperation has successfully fostered international antitrust convergence. A growing number of states enforce increasingly consistent antitrust
rules today without any binding international agreement requiring them to do
so. Eventually, successful voluntary convergence could pave the way for binding
cooperation. However, this article has argued that nonbinding agreements are
likely to persist for three primary reasons. First, as cooperation under nonbinding agreements is largely self-enforcing, the added value of a binding agreement
with provisions for monitoring, enforcement, and sanctions is trivial. Second, in
the absence of coordinated domestic interest group support for international
antitrust cooperation, a binding agreement would not provide states with any
domestic political economy rents and therefore will remain a low national priority. Finally, the emerging voluntary convergence will slowly eradicate negative
externalities stemming from decentralized antitrust regimes, making the case
for a binding international agreement less compelling.
By arguing that nonbinding agreements are preferable to binding agreements, even in situations where binding agreements are feasible, this article
disputes the view that nonbinding agreements are second-best instruments for
fostering international antitrust convergence. States have not chosen nonbinding agreements because their ﬁrst-best regime choice has been unavailable.
Instead, states have viewed binding agreements as unnecessary and undesirable.
An optimal institutional design must be consistent with state interests to be
effective. By acknowledging both the difﬁculties involved in the pursuit of binding international antitrust cooperation and the ability of nonbinding agreements
to mitigate those difﬁculties, this article raises two critical questions. First, given
the obstacles to international antitrust cooperation, how could a binding agreement emerge? And second, assuming that a binding agreement could emerge,
what would it add to the existing nonbinding international antitrust regime?
Until the proponents of a binding international antitrust agreement can answer
those questions, nonbinding cooperation is, and will likely remain, the preferred
solution.

